MEMORANDUM OPINION: This is an appeal from a statutory county court's judgment in an eviction suit awarding possession of certain residential property to Richland Property Partners Inc. See generally Tex. Prop. Code §§ 24.001-.011. On Richland's motion, we vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the suit as moot. See Alsobrook v. MTGLQ Invs., LP, 656 S.W.3d 394, 395 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam). According both to documents filed in the record and to Richland, Appellant Moses Cruz and his wife had signed a note with an associated lien in favor of a company for the construction of a swimming pool at the property. Richland alleges that the note-and lienholder foreclosed on the lien for nonpayment and sold the property to Richland. Richland also alleges that it then filed this eviction suit partly because the Cruzes remained on the property without agreeing to any lease with Richland and without paying any month-to-month rent. The statutory county court [*2] after a final bench trial rendered judgment for possession of the property for Richland. Cruz perfected this appeal from the judgment of possession and has filed his appellant's brief, assigning as error two issues regarding the trial court's "providing possession to Richland." In his first issue, Cruz contends that awarding possession was improper because of problems with the required notices leading up to the lienholder's prior foreclosure. In his second issue, Cruz contends that awarding possession was improper because there were other procedural problems with the foreclosure and alleged fraud in the assignment of the note-and lienholder's interests to Richland. Richland has now moved to dismiss this appeal because of mootness. It explains, and the record bears out, that after the trial court rendered its judgment of possession, the court gave Richland a writ of possession for the property. Richland adds that it has since executed on the writ, the Cruzes have vacated the property, and Richland has sold the property to another. Cruz, for his part, represents that he and his wife no longer live at the property. The only issue in an eviction suit such as this is the right to actual possession [*3] of the property. See Marshall v. Housing Auth. of City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. 2006). When the property at issue in such a suit has been sold and the appellant tenant no longer lives at the property, the eviction suit and associated appeal become moot and must be dismissed. See id. at 787, 790; Alsobrook v. MTGLQ Invs., LP, 657 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021), aff'd, 656 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam); Allen-Mercer v. Roscoe Props., No. 03-15-00674-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9247, 2016 WL 4506294, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.). This remains so even when the appellant tenant is challenging the validity of the process leading up to foreclosure and thus proper title to the property. See Goebel v. Sharon Peters Real Estate, Inc., No. 03-14-00635-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3745, 2015 WL 1778295, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Cruz's appellate issues challenge the validity of the foreclosure and proper title to the property and thus do not save this eviction suit from mootness. See id. Cruz in his response to Richland's motion to dismiss argues that because this appeal was perfected before the property at issue was sold, the case cannot be moot. But cases may become moot even while an appeal is pending, and the proper result is still dismissal. See Alsobrook, 656 S.W.3d at 395 (observing that case may become moot on appeal); Allen-Mercer, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9247, 2016 WL 4506294, at *2 ("A case becomes moot if, during any stage of the proceedings, a controversy ceases to exist between the parties."); see also Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) ("[A] controversy must exist between the parties at every stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal. If a controversy ceases to exist—'the issues presented [*4] are no longer "live" or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome'—the case becomes moot." (internal citation omitted) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982) (per curiam))). We thus conclude that this case is moot. The proper appellate disposition in this circumstance is to vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss the suit. See Alsobrook, 656 S.W.3d at 395. The statutory county court's judgment is vacated, and this suit is dismissed.

Overview - Key Legal Holdings: •Where a will required Amy to convey property in substantially the same form as provided in Exhibit A but Exhibit A was missing, the condition precedent was not ambiguous because the will clearly identified the property to be conveyed, the recipient, and used language indicating the exhibit was illustrative rather than mandatory. •Amy's impossibility defense failed on summary judgment where she presented no evidence of attempting to perform the property conveyance or that any factual or legal condition prevented her from conveying her property interest to Joel, with her sole argument being the missing exhibit. Material Facts: •Frances Walzel died in 2021 leaving a will bequeathing her estate to five children. •The will contained condition precedent clauses requiring Amy to convey her interest in an 83.10-acre tract to Joel within 60 days. •The will referenced Exhibit A for the deed form, but no Exhibit A was attached. •Amy did not execute any conveyance to Joel. •Parties filed competing summary judgment motions on declaratory judgment claims. Controlling Law: •Texas law on will construction and ambiguity (San Antonio Area Found. v. Lang). •Summary judgment standards under Texas law (Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm'n). •Doctrine of impossibility of performance (Garcia v. Baumgarten). •Contract interpretation principles regarding missing exhibits (Sharifi v. Steen Auto., LLC). Court Rationale: The court reasoned that the will's language was clear regarding Amy's obligation to convey her property interest to Joel, and the reference to substantially the same form as Exhibit A indicated the exhibit was illustrative rather than mandatory. The essential conveyance information was present in the will itself, making the missing exhibit non-essential. Amy failed to present evidence supporting her impossibility defense, having made no attempt to perform the required conveyance. Outcome - Procedural Outcome: The trial court's summary judgment in favor of Franci and Kyle was affirmed. Amy's inheritance was limited to one-fifth of the residuary estate due to her failure to satisfy the condition precedent. Amy's appeal was denied on all issues.

Overview: Key Legal Holdings: •Where Kelley's petition alleged that "Defendants, acting in concert, defamed Plaintiff by making false statements" about matters of public concern (teacher misconduct), the TCPA applied to Kelley's claims against Satterlee despite Kelley's later argument that Satterlee made no statements. •Kelley failed to meet his burden because his specific allegations against Satterlee (investigating Kelley's history, using police connections, contacting ex-wife) did not include publishing any statement, which is an essential element of defamation. •The trial court properly awarded Satterlee $14,507.67 in attorney's fees (one-third of total fees for three defendants) and $1,000 in sanctions based on Kelley's admission he had no evidence of defamatory comments by Satterlee. Material Facts: •Kelley sued Satterlee and others for defamation, tortious interference, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy. •Kelley's petition alleged all defendants made defamatory statements or conspired to publish them. •Kelley specifically alleged Satterlee investigated his history, used police connections to obtain information, posed as an employer to contact HOA board members' employers, and contacted Kelley's ex-wife. •No Facebook posts were attributed to Satterlee. •Satterlee filed a TCPA motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Controlling Law: •Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), which protects the right to free speech on matters of public concern. •Three-step burden-shifting process for TCPA motions: movant shows TCPA applies, nonmovant establishes prima facie case, movant establishes affirmative defense. •Elements of defamation: defendant published a false statement, that defamed plaintiff, with requisite fault, and damages resulted. Court Rationale: The TCPA applied because Kelley's petition alleged Satterlee made defamatory statements about matters of public concern (teacher misconduct). Kelley failed to present clear and specific evidence that Satterlee published any false statement, an essential element of defamation. The trial court was required to award attorney's fees upon granting a TCPA motion, and Satterlee presented uncontroverted evidence of reasonable fees. Sanctions were justified by Kelley's admission he had no evidence against Satterlee. Outcome: Procedural Outcome: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Kelley's claims against Satterlee with prejudice and the award of $14,507.67 in attorney's fees and $1,000 in sanctions. The court remanded solely for determination of Satterlee's reasonable and necessary appellate attorney's fees, which the trial court was required to award but lacked sufficient evidence to determine.

Overview: Key Legal Holdings: •The trial court did not err in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. •The trial court did not err in concluding that a new motorcycle is "comparable" or of "like kind and quality" to suffice as a replacement for appellee's damaged motorcycle. •The trial court did not err by awarding appellee attorney's fees under the Carmack Amendment. Material Facts: •Appellee Kahn hired appellants Bekins Van Lines and Willis Permian Movers for an interstate household move, including his 2009 Can-Am Spyder motorcycle. •During the move, the motorcycle was damaged when a ramp collapsed and the motorcycle fell off the moving truck. •Kahn filed a claim with Bekins, who offered $9,905 to settle based on their assessment of the motorcycle's value. •Kahn rejected the offer and sued under the Carmack Amendment, seeking the cost of a replacement motorcycle and other damages. •After a bench trial, the court awarded Kahn $58,457.98 in damages, including $29,228.99 for a replacement 2022 motorcycle and $29,228.99 in loss-of-use damages, as well as attorney's fees. Controlling Law: •The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14706. Court Rationale: The trial court announced its reasons for its ruling in open court, including the specific evidence it considered in calculating damages for replacement value and loss-of-use, its reasoning for granting loss-of-use damages, and that it was denying appellee's Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim. Its reasons for its judgment are thus apparent from the record, and the presumption of harmful error is rebutted. The Surface Transportation Board has authorized replacement with new items under the Carmack Amendment's full replacement value protection option, and the contract terms did not preclude replacing the damaged 2009 motorcycle with a new one. Appellee met the statutory requirements for an attorney's fee award under the Carmack Amendment by prevailing on his claim and establishing that appellants did not advise him of an available dispute resolution program. Outcome: Procedural Outcome: Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and rendered.

Overview: Key Legal Holdings: •An interlocutory appeal is permitted from an order that denies a motion to dismiss filed under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). •No interlocutory appeal is permitted from an order granting a TCPA motion to dismiss. •The court lacked appellate jurisdiction because the trial court signed the order partially denying Lindeen’s TCPA motion to dismiss on April 23, 2024. Consequently, Lindeen’s notice of appeal was due within twenty days, by May 13, 2024. Lindeen did not file a notice of appeal until December 4, 2024. The time to appeal from the trial court’s partial denial of Lindeen’s TCPA motion to dismiss commenced when the trial court addressed the merits of the motion, on April 23, 2024, not with the subsequent order on attorney’s fees and sanctions. Material Facts: •Kelley filed a defamation suit against Lindeen and others for posting false statements about him on Facebook. •Lindeen and others moved to dismiss under the TCPA and sought attorney’s fees and sanctions. •On April 23, 2024, the trial court partially granted and partially denied Lindeen’s TCPA motion to dismiss, deferring a decision on attorney’s fees and sanctions. •On November 25, 2024, the trial court denied Lindeen’s request for attorney’s fees and sanctions. •On December 4, 2024, Lindeen filed an interlocutory appeal from both orders. Controlling Law •Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(12) (allowing interlocutory appeal of order denying TCPA motion to dismiss). •Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1 (requiring timely notice of appeal). •Eureka Holdings Acquisitions, L.P. v. Marshall Apts., LLC, 597 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. App.-Austin 2020, pet. denied) (time to appeal partial denial of TCPA motion runs from order on merits, not later order on fees/sanctions). Court Rationale: The court followed the holding in Eureka Holdings that the deadline to appeal a partial denial of a TCPA motion starts when the trial court rules on the merits of the motion, not when it later rules on attorney's fees and sanctions. Since Lindeen's notice of appeal was filed months after the deadline from the April 2024 order denying her TCPA motion in part, the appeal from that order was untimely and had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court also relied on Eureka in holding that there is no statutory basis for an interlocutory appeal solely from an order denying attorney's fees and sanctions related to a TCPA dismissal. Any appeal of that issue must await final judgment. Outcome: Procedural Outcome: The court granted Kelley's motion to dismiss Lindeen's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Lindeen's appeal was dismissed, but the court declined to award sanctions against her.

Overview: Key Legal Holdings: •The trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment resolving the parties' dispute over satisfaction of the prior judgments, as it did not impermissibly interpret the prior judgments but resolved the parties' justiciable controversy over whether the judgments were satisfied by the payments made. •Principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not preclude the trial court from adjudicating the parties' dispute, as the declaratory judgment action did not seek to relitigate claims from the prior suits or issues that could have been raised therein. •The evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's findings that Alisha Flood's cashier's check for $1,000 should be credited towards satisfying the $2,000 judgment, and that the total $2,000 judgment was satisfied by the payments from Chad Walker ($1,055.50) and Flood ($1,000). •The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Casey for making misrepresentations of law regarding whether certain proceedings qualified as "civil actions" for purposes of the vexatious litigant statute. Material Facts: •Anne Coyle sued her brother Chad Walker and his ex-wife Alisha Flood in two prior suits in 2012. •In 2015, the parties entered into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) to resolve both suits, with Walker and Flood agreeing to pay Coyle a total judgment of $2,000 in monthly installments. •Separate final orders were entered in each prior suit in 2015 and 2016, memorializing the terms of the MSA. •In 2016, Walker paid Coyle $1,055.50 by certified check, and Flood sent Coyle a $1,000 cashier's check with a notation "Settlement in Full" which Coyle did not cash. •Walker and Flood filed the underlying declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the $2,000 judgment was satisfied by their payments to Coyle. •The trial court declared the judgment satisfied and also sanctioned Flood and Walker's former attorney Casey for misrepresentations made in a prior vexatious litigant motion against Coyle. Controlling Law: •Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011). •Texas rules on res judicata and collateral estoppel. •Texas standards for legal and factual sufficiency of evidence. •Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 10 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 (regarding sanctions). •Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 11 (vexatious litigants statute). •Texas Business and Commerce Code provisions regarding effect of certified checks (§ 3.310). Court Rationale: The court had subject-matter jurisdiction because the declaratory judgment resolved a justiciable controversy between the parties over satisfaction of the prior judgments, rather than impermissibly interpreting those judgments. Res judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because the declaratory judgment action did not relitigate claims or issues from the prior suits, but instead adjudicated the parties' conduct and disputes after entry of those judgments. The evidence supported the findings that Flood's $1,000 cashier's check should be credited along with Walker's $1,055.50 payment to satisfy the total $2,000 judgment incorporated in the MSA and final orders. The court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Casey because he made misrepresentations of law regarding whether certain proceedings qualified as "civil actions" under the vexatious litigants statute, after being put on notice his position was incorrect. Outcome: Procedural Outcome: Judgment affirmed.

Overview: Key Legal Holdings: •Res judicata did not bar Preston Hollow's state court claims because the federal district court would have clearly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims after dismissing the federal takings claim. •Cottonwood failed to establish that the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) allows a governmental body to sue itself for alleged TOMA violations. •The loan documents were not void for lack of Texas Attorney General approval under the Texas Transportation Code. •Attorney immunity barred Cottonwood's claims against Winstead relating to payment of attorney's fees from the loan proceeds. Material Facts: •Cottonwood, a local government corporation created by the City of Hutto, obtained a $35 million loan from Preston Hollow to finance a real estate development project. •After an initial $15 million disbursement, a dispute arose over whether Preston Hollow properly withheld the remaining $2.5 million in escrow. •Cottonwood alleged the loan documents were void due to TOMA violations, lack of Attorney General approval, and other defects. •Preston Hollow sued in federal court alleging an unconstitutional taking, which was dismissed. Cottonwood counterclaimed alleging the loan transaction was invalid. •In state court, Cottonwood claimed Winstead improperly had $60,000 in attorney's fees paid from the loan proceeds. Controlling Law: •Federal res judicata principles. •Texas Open Meetings Act. •Texas Transportation Code provisions regarding local government corporation bonds/notes. •Texas law on attorney immunity. Court Rationale: The federal court dismissing Preston Hollow's takings claim would have clearly declined supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims under its practices, so res judicata did not bar the state court claims. TOMA does not authorize a governmental body like Cottonwood to sue itself or the city that created it for alleged open meeting violations. Failure to obtain Attorney General approval under the Transportation Code does not void the loan documents, it just means a statutory defense is unavailable. Winstead's conduct in ensuring attorney's fees were paid from loan proceeds was within the scope of representing its client Preston Hollow in the arm's length transaction, so attorney immunity applied. Outcome: Procedural Outcome: The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Preston Hollow and Winstead on all claims.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In an appeal from a final judgment confirming an arbitration award, appellants waived their complaint that the trial court erred by ordering the parties to arbitrate their dispute in the absence of an arbitration agreement, when they failed to raise any objection to the court's order and, instead, signed an arbitration agreement agreeing to submit the dispute with appellees to arbitration; [2]-As for appellants complaint that the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award, appellees petitioned the district court to confirm the award and appellants did not respond and made no effort to establish any of the grounds for vacating, modifying or correcting an arbitration award under the Texas Arbitration Act or otherwise, thereby failing to preserve the issue. Outcome: Judgment affirmed.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In appellant company's appeal against the trial court's grant of appellee's Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) motion to dismiss appellant's defamation action against appellee, appellant's argument that the court erred in granting the motion as the hearing occurred more than 90 days after the motion was served in violation of Tex. Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code Ann. § 27.004(a) was unsuccessful because appellant waived its right to object to the untimeliness of the TCPA hearing by agreeing not to raise the issue on appeal;[2]-Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case for defamation per se because the statements in appellee's review of the company were opinions or substantially true, not verifiable false statements of fact required for defamation per se. Outcome: Judgment affirmed.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria: This cause is before the Court on appellee's motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.1 We now dismiss the matter for want of jurisdiction. On October 25, 2023, the trial court entered a default judgment in this matter. On December 8, 2023, an email was sent to the trial court indicating appellant desired to appeal the judgment. The email appears to be from Danny Bucher, who is not currently a licensed attorney in the State of Texas. On January 17, 2024, the Clerk of the Court notified appellant that the appeal has not been timely perfected, so that steps could be taken to correct the defect, if it could be done. Appellant was advised that, if the defect was not corrected within ten days from the date of the Court's letter, the appeal would be dismissed. The Clerk of the Court also notified appellant that it appears they are unrepresented by an attorney and that only a licensed attorney may [*2] appear and represent a corporation in litigation. See Kunstoplast of Am. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996). Appellant was instructed to explain who has legal authority to act on behalf of appellant by January 26, 2024. Appellant has failed to respond to either notice. The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file and appellant's failure to timely perfect his appeal, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction and appellee's motion is dismissed as moot. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), (c).

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In a wrongful termination case based on gender and pregnancy, the court did not err in overruling the employee's objection to the employer's closing argument regarding her failure to present coworkers as witnesses during the trial because the employee had not shown that she was harmed by the employer's counsel's reference in closing argument to her failure to call other coworkers as witnesses and her termination was as a result of her poor performance. Outcome: Judgment affirmed.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-There was no abuse of discretion in striking the medical records because they were not identified or produced until four months after the close of discovery and, among other things, appellant did not cite any reasons that she could not have obtained the medical records during the nine-month discovery period; [2]-Appellees conclusively established entitlement to traditional summary judgment on the testamentary capacity issue because appellant's evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact in that appellant's evidence did not, inter alia, address decedent's mental state before she executed the will and did not indicate that decedent suffered from a persistent condition that affected her competency at the time she executed her will. Outcome: Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Memorandum Opinion

Procedural Posture: Cross-appeals were taken from judgments of the 269th District Court, Harris County (Texas), which, in post-judgment proceedings, reduced or eliminated jury awards in favor of plaintiffs, residents of a community where a water well had become contaminated by pollution caused by defendant oil company's predecessor. Overview: The residents alleged that benzene in their drinking water caused various health problems. The jury, finding the oil company negligent and grossly negligent, awarded a large sum in actual and punitive damages. In post-judgment proceedings, the trial court reduced or eliminated most of the jury awards, rendering take-nothing judgments against four adults and reducing the amount of judgments for two minors. The court, after examining several epidemiological studies upon which the residents relied, concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish causation. None of the studies established a statistically significant doubling of the risk of childhood leukemia from exposure to benzene, and there was no significant epidemiological information on other health effects of long-term exposure to low levels of benzene. Moreover, Texas law did not permit recovery of mental anguish damages for fears related to developing diseases that had not occurred and were not shown to be likely. Outcome: The court affirmed the setting aside of the judgments for the adult residents, reversed the judgment in favor of the minors, and rendered judgment that all of the residents take nothing.

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Appellant Skyler Williams, derivatively on behalf of Blackland Construction, Inc., filed a conditional notice of appeal on September 6, 2019.1 Appellant therein described that it intended to appeal a discovery order dated April 26, 2018, but only if another party appealed the trial court's final judgment. Appellee James G. Miller, Jr. next filed a Notice of Suggestion of Bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), this appeal was automatically stayed; thus, we ordered the appeal abated and for it to be removed from the Court's docket. On May 3, 2023, we ordered that either a motion or response be filed regarding the status of [*2] the bankruptcy. On May 8, 2023, Appellant filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. Appellant informed the Court of the parties entering a settlement agreement that includes a provision acknowledging that all matters between them are fully resolved. Appellee James G. Miller, Jr. also responded on May 24, 2023, informing the Court that the bankruptcy proceeding had been discharged. Appellee further confirmed he was not opposed to Appellant's motion to dismiss and also requested dismissal of the case. The motion is granted, and this appeal is dismissed. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. Appellant shall bear all costs of the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(d). GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order granting city planning and zoning commissioners' plea to the jurisdiction because the commissioners were duty-bound to interpret the City of Georgetown, Texas, Unified Development Code (UDC), consider certain listed items, and determine whether a plat conformed to the standards in the UDC, Georgetown, Tex., Unified Dev. Code §§ 2.05.010(A)(1), 3.08.070(C)(2), and 12.01.040(B); [2]-Because the commissioners adhered to that duty in determining that a preliminary plat conformed to the applicable standards, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to compel a contrary determination by mandamus. After concluding that the plat conformed, the commissioners approved it, as required by statute. Even if incorrect in their conclusion, the commissioners did not exceed the scope of their authority. Outcome: Judgment of court of appeals reversed and association's claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In buyer's claims for common-law fraud and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), the court concluded that the law-of-the-case doctrine applied and precluded reconsideration of whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether buyer was fraudulently induced to purchase subject property "as is" because the summary-judgment evidence suggested that the sellers knowingly misrepresented whether there had previously been a fire on the property and that buyer reasonably relied on the misrepresentation by entering into the "as-is" contract; although the court did not separately discuss whether the evidence was sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether the sellers intended to induce buyer's reliance on the as-is clause, evidence was sufficient that buyer met her burden to adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to support her claim. Outcome: Judgment reversed and remanded.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court did not err in granting, in part, appellee's motion to dismiss under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a because the allegations in appellant's First Amended Petition for Bill of Review had no basis in law and did not entitle him to the relief he sought as the issues he presented in the amended petition for bill of review had already been unsuccessfully litigated and he was merely attempting further review of the same claim. Outcome: Order affirmed.

MEMORANDUM OPINION: The parties, representing that they have reached a settlement agreement, have filed an agreed motion to vacate the trial court's judgment and dismiss this appeal. No opinion has issued in this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(c). Accordingly, we grant the parties' motion, set aside the trial court's judgment without regard to the merits, and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(2)(A), 43.2(e); see, e.g., Jester Venture Ltd. v. Nash, No. 01-06-00512-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 6435, 2006 WL 2042358, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 17, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (vacating trial court's judgment and dismissing case on parties' agreed motion). We dismiss any other pending motions as moot.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-Where the trial court granted a receiver's motion for authority to sell the receivership estate's interest in property, the debtor's appeal raising substantive complaints regarding the propriety of the sale order was not moot because the sale had already taken place; [2]-The sale order was not void, because the trial court had jurisdiction over the trust because the attorney acting on behalf of the trust made a general appearance in open court under Tex. R. Civ. P. 120; [3]-Because the sale was ordered and consummated and the receiver was in possession of the proceeds of the sale, the debtor's merits issues were mooted by the sale. Outcome: Affirmed; and dismissed.

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Appellants J&E McConkey Family Limited Partnership, derivatively on behalf of Georgetown Family Emergency Center, LLC; Dr. Joshua McConkey, individually; Dr. John Valentini, individually; Dr. Ryan Prudoff, individually; RSPTRI Master, LLC; and Georgetown JJV, LLC have filed an unopposed motion to dismiss this appeal. We grant appellants' motion and dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a).

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The homeowners' association had standing to pursue its claims against the city's zoning commission because its members had credible concerns that the development of the new subdivision would create a material increase in traffic on the road at issue, the one neighborhood roadway that would serve as the sole inlet for both subdivisions, and added congestion of the road created a potential risk to the safety and welfare of residents. Therefore, the association's members had an interest peculiar and distinguishable from the public generally; [2]-Because the commission's evidence failed to show that it performed a purely ministerial act in approving the plat, it did not provide conclusive evidence of a lack of jurisdiction, and the trial court erred by granting the commission's plea to the jurisdiction. Outcome: Order reversed and case remanded. Escalera Ranch Owners' Ass'n v. Schroeder, 610 S.W.3d 521, 524

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Appellees Victor Garcia and Wanda Garcia have filed a motion to dismiss this appeal. Appellant Marlonia Ivy filed a notice of appeal on February 11, 2020. Although the initial notice of appeal states that Ivy appeals "from the final judgment rendered on January 16, 2020," the trial court's order, titled "Partial Summary Judgment," reflects that the trial court signed it on January 30, 2020, after hearing the Garcias' summary-judgment motion on January 3, 2020, and January 16, 2020.1 In their motion to dismiss, the Garcias assert that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal because the January 30, 2020 order is not a final judgment. In addition to being titled "Partial Summary Judgment," the order explicitly states that "the Court is not ruling on Defendants' request for additional attorney's fees at this time, without prejudice to Defendants' ability to later urge that request." Accordingly, the Garcias' request for attorneys' fees remains outstanding. Furthermore, [*2] the order on its face unequivocally states that it does not finally dispose of all claims. See In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 827-828 (2018) (per curiam) (analyzing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205-06 (Tex. 2001), and holding that judgment containing unambiguous finality phrase, which stated that judgment was final and appealable and disposed of all claims and parties, operated as final judgment, and finality phrase must be taken at face value even if all claims are not actually disposed of). There is no indication that a final judgment is imminent. As a general rule, a party may only appeal from a final judgment. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Accordingly, we grant the Garcias' motion and dismiss the appeal without prejudice to refiling after the trial court issues an order disposing of the remaining claim for attorneys' fees. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-A trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing regarding whether requiring immediate payment of an award of monetary sanctions by a party's attorney would deprive the attorney or the party of access to the courts; therefore, the trial court was required to modify its order to allow the attorney an opportunity to appeal the merits of the sanctions before the sanctions must be paid; [2]-The court declined to consider the merits of the vexatious-litigant ruling because the attorney had not established that an adequate appellate remedy was lacking. Outcome: Mandamus petition conditionally granted.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In appellant's suit alleging appellees failed to disclose information in connection with the sale of their home, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the as-is clause because a fact issue existed as to whether the clause was enforceable as appellant asserted appellees fraudulently induced her into the as-is contract; [2]-Appellant's affidavit stated that if the fire had been disclosed by appellees, she would not have entered into an as-is purchase contract. Outcome: Reversed and remanded.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to plaintiff on the issue of liquidated damages because the proof of damages was legally insufficient to support the amount awarded as the affidavit submitted by plaintiff as to the balance owed on the contract, liquidated damages, and replacement costs failed to provide the underlying factual basis for the amounts claimed and was, therefore, conclusory and provided no evidence of damages. Outcome: Judgment reversed; case remanded to trial court for a new trial on both liability and damages. Tyhan, Inc. v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8847, *1

MEMORANDUM OPINION: The second amended petition for writ of mandamus is denied. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). The emergency motions for stay and for temporary relief are also denied. See id. R. 52.10. David Puryear, Justice

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The court erred in denying the former husband's Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a motion to dismiss because the former wife's real property partition suit had no basis in law since she had no enforceable property interest in the residence. Outcome: Judgment reversed and rendered in part, and remanded in part.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The contractor was, by his own admission, the bank's roofing contractor, and as a matter of law, he was a "contractor" under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 95; [2]-The evidence did not establish that the contractor's injury occurred while he was performing work described by Chapter 95; [3]-The evidence showed that the bank had never fully decided what, if any, repairs to make to the roof before the contractor was injured. Outcome: Judgment affirmed.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-Where appellant was granted summary judgment on his Deceptive Trade Practice Act (DTPA) claims against appellee car salesman, appellee's motion for a new trial was properly denied as his claim he failed to respond to the motion because appellant did not send him notice of the hearing was contradicted by appellant's evidence, which the trial court was entitled to credit; [2]-Appellant was properly granted summary judgment as to liability because appellee, by failing to respond to requests for admissions, admitted representing the car he sold was in good working condition, despite his knowledge of its true condition, which, along with appellant's other evidence, established the elements of the DTPA claims; [3]-The damage award could not stand, as the summary judgment proof failed on the question of economic damages regarding the value of the car in the condition it was sold. Outcome: The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.

MEMORANDUM OPINION: Appellant Max Rodriguez has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.1. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. David Puryear, Justice

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court properly denied a borrower's counterclaim for wrongful foreclosure based on the lender's alleged lack of standing, as the transfer of the lender's interest in one note and deed of trust was only a collateral security transfer; [2]-The lender did not have to make an election of remedies because there were two defaults and deficiencies based on two notes, there was no issue of an "inconsistent remedy" pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 51.003(a), and the borrower waived any complaint about the amount of deficiency from the first foreclosure; [3]-Sufficient evidence supported the deficiency judgment based on the implied finding of the fair market value of the property pursuant to § 51.003(b), and the borrower was not entitled to an offset due to his failure to conclusively prove that the value of the property exceeded its foreclosure sale price. Outcome: Judgment affirmed.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-Even when service is made on the Texas Secretary of State under authority of Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 5.251-5.253 (2012), a trial court does not have personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant unless a Whitney certificate is part of the record; [2]-Accordingly, a trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over two Delaware limited liability companies that had been sued by a Texas limited liability company, even though they had been served by service upon the Secretary of State pursuant to §§ 5.251-5.253, because, at the time it entered a default judgment against them, the record did not contain a Whitney certificate. Outcome: Judgment reversed and case remanded.

Relator Cunningham Constructors & Associates, Inc. has filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial court's order transferring venue of its suit against the real party in interest, Atlas Electric of West Texas, LLC. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8. Having reviewed relator's filings, the responses, and the record provided, we deny relator's petition for mandamus relief. See id. R. 52.8(a).

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In a dispute between the managers of a limited liability company (LLC) and a related company, a county court properly refused to compel the parties to arbitrate where it could not be concluded that they entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate because a settlement agreement, in which the arbitration provision was embedded, did not meet either of the requirements under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 101.255, given that one manager had independently drafted and executed the agreement without consulting or even informing the other manager, and given that the agreement could not be construed as fair to the LLC; [2]-The court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against the justice of the peace or justice court because appellants did not argue or show that a writ of mandamus was necessary to preserve its jurisdiction. Outcome: Order refusing to compel arbitration affirmed and mandamus petition dismissed in all other respects.

Appeal was stayed for bankruptcy Proceedings on March 26, 2014. The parties notified the Court that the bankruptcy court granted the joint motion to compromise appellee Westport Group, Inc.'s claims against appellant Tower Car Wash, Inc. The bankruptcy court ordered the parties to submit an agreed motion to the Court to dismiss with prejudice all appeals by either party. Accordingly, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss this appeal by agreement and the the Motion to Dismiss was Granted.

Following a bench trial, White Stone Properties Ltd. ("White Stone") appeals from a final judgment entered by the district court, holding that Central Mutual Insurance Company ("Central Mutual") owed no further payment to its insured, White Stone, under the terms of a replacement-cost coverage provision of an insurance policy ("the Policy"). White Stone also appeals from the district court's holding that White Stone "take nothing" on its counter claims against Central Mutual for (1) a declaratory judgment that Central Mutual owes payments to White Stone pursuant to the Policy; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) violations of the Texas Insurance Code. A careful review of the record in this case, a full consideration of the parties' briefs and oral arguments, and a thorough analysis of the district court's articulate ruling lead us to conclude that the district court's judgment was correct. Because the district court opinion's careful analysis thoroughly explains its sound reasons and judgment, we need not engage in a redundant analysis simply to reach the same result. We therefore AFFIRM the district court's judgment for essentially the same reasons assigned by the district court.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The appellate court lacked jurisdiction because there was not yet a final, appealable judgment, and neither the summary judgment nor severance order contained finality language, or any other clear indication that the trial court intended the order to completely dispose of the entire case; [2]-The subcontractor's lien could not be foreclosed without a trial court judgment foreclosing the lien and ordering that the contractor's property be sold, Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 53.154. Outcome: Appeal dismissed.

Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-The trial court erred in determining that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 95 applies to plaintiff's claims against the bank because he was not a contractor as contemplated by the statute; [2]-Because construing the term contractor to include plaintiff would preempt his common-law negligence and premises-liability claims and provide his exclusive remedy against the bank, the appellate court was especially reticent to extend the plain meaning of contractor beyond its ordinary meaning and must construe the statute strictly; [3]-The bank failed to identify summary judgment evidence conclusively establishing that plaintiff was a contractor under Chapter 95; [4]-The summary-judgment record was insufficient to establish the applicability of Chapter 95 as a matter of law. Outcome: The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.

Procedural Posture: Appellant landlord challenged a final summary judgment entered by the District Court of Williamson County, 368th Judicial District, Texas, in favor of appellee, a member of a charitable bingo association that was the landlord's tenant, in the landlord's breach of contract action against the member, which alleged that the member was liable for damages resulting from the association's breach of its commercial property lease. Overview: The member had asserted that, as a matter of law, it was not liable under the lease agreement because it was not a party to the lease and also that, under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. ch. 252, it could not be liable for the contractual obligations of the association. The court held that the trial court did not err in applying chapter 252 to the association and its members. The summary judgment evidence established that the association operated for a common, nonprofit purpose and thus was an unincorporated nonprofit association as defined by chapter 252 and governed solely by that chapter. The court concluded that the Texas Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act, Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. §§ 252.001-.017 (2012), abrogated the common law and that, under Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 252.006, the member could not be liable for the actions of the association merely because the member allegedly assented to or ratified the lease. Accordingly, the court did not need to reach the landlord argument that there was a fact issue about whether the member authorized or ratified the lease, and the trial court thus did not err in granting the member summary judgment on that basis. Outcome: The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Procedural Posture: Plaintiff video game developer sued defendants, including a video game publisher, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. An arbitrator awarded defendants monetary compensation and a perpetual license in a video game's intellectual property. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas vacated the arbitrator's award. Defendants appealed. Overview: The developer and the publisher entered into a video game publishing agreement, under which the developer was obligated to design and develop a "high quality" video game and the publisher was obligated to provide most of the investment funding and was also primarily responsible for manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling the game. The parties' business relationship deteriorated. The arbitrator found that the developer had actively engaged in a litany of fraudulent misrepresentations and contractual breaches. The appellate court determined that the arbitrator's award should have been upheld because the perpetual license was a remedy that furthered the essence of the publishing agreement since the perpetual license granted to the publisher represented an attempt by the arbitrator to restore to the parties the fundamental goal of the agreement: mutual access to financial benefits derived from their joint creation and distribution of the game. The only way to give the publisher the opportunity to benefit from the future development of variations of the game was to cut the publisher loose from the developer and allow it to independently pursue game marketing efforts. Outcome: The appellate court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to reinstate the arbitrator's award.

Procedural Posture: Petitioner home sellers sought review of an order from the Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas, which reversed an award of attorney fees in their favor in an action by respondent purchasers for violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Overview: The purchasers sued the sellers after discovering cracks in the home's sheetrock. The sellers sought their attorney fees as sanctions under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ch. 10 on the ground that the purchasers' claims were groundless. Alternatively, they sought attorney fees under the earnest money contract, which provided that the prevailing party was entitled to recover attorney fees. The purchasers filed a notice of nonsuit without prejudice. The trial court ordered that the purchasers pay the sellers' attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed the judgment. On review, the court held that the court of appeals did not err in reversing the award of attorney fees under the contract, as the trial court awarded fees based solely on the purchasers' nonsuit without prejudice. No determination had been made as to whether the purchasers nonsuited in order to avoid an unfavorable ruling. Accordingly, it was necessary to remand the case for a determination on that issue. The court appeals erred in dismissing the purchasers' claims without allowing them an opportunity for a hearing on their ch. 10 claims; such a decision ran afoul of Tex. R. Civ. P. 162. Outcome: The court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the purchasers' contractual attorney fees claim to the trial court. The court remanded the purchasers' claim for attorney fees under ch. 10.

Procedural Posture: Appellant buyers sought review of a judgment from the County Court at Law No. 4 of Williamson County (Texas), which ordered that the buyers take nothing in a suit alleging defects in a house and that they pay appellee sellers' attorney fees. Overview: After the buyers filed suit asserting fraud and other claims, the sellers filed a counterclaim requesting attorney fees under a provision of the sales contract that allowed attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in any legal proceeding related to the contract. Before trial, the buyers nonsuited all of their claims. The trial court conducted a bench trial on the attorney fee claim. The court stated that although it was not improper under Tex. R. Civ. P. 162 for the trial court to dispose of the claims of all parties together in its judgment, the buyers' claims should have been dismissed without prejudice and not by means of a take-nothing judgment, which was on the merits. The attorney fee provision was broad enough to encompass the buyers' claims; however, because the buyers nonsuited all of their claims before trial, the sellers could not be prevailing parties because they did not prevail on the merits of any legal proceeding related to the contract. It was irrelevant that the statute of limitations had expired before the nonsuit was taken and that the buyers had not filed a response to the counterclaim before appearing at trial. Outcome: The court modified the judgment to reflect a dismissal without prejudice of the buyers' claims, reversed the award of attorney fees to the sellers, and rendered judgment that the sellers take nothing on that claim.

Procedural Posture: Appellant assignee challenged a decision from the 212th District Court, Galveston County, Texas, which entered judgment in favor of appellees, a debtor and a lienholder, in a case seeking a judicial foreclosure and reformation of a deed of trust. Overview: The debtor contracted for home remodeling, and he executed a promissory note and deed of trust. The deed's property description was incorrect. Judgment was entered for the debtor and the lienholder in a subsequent action seeking judicial foreclosure and reformation. This appeal followed. In partially reversing, the appellate court determined that there was no error in striking an affidavit and refusing to allow an amendment of such. Further, limitations barred the assignee's claims under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.035. There was no reason to reform the deed. An individual judgment was properly entered against the assignee's managing partner because he used an assumed name when collecting debts. A trial amendment based on the assumed name was proper. Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Texas law were not the result of a bona fide error. The evidence was sufficient to show a knowing violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, as well as to support an award of mental anguish. However, the attorney's fees awarded should have been segregated. Finally, there was no error in allowing the lienholder to file a counterclaim during trial. Outcome: The portion of the decision awarding the debtor his attorney's fees was reversed. That portion of the judgment was severed, and it was remanded for a new trial on the issue of recoverable attorney's fees. The trial court's decision was affirmed in all other respects."

Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court without opinion.

Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Procedural Posture: Appellant joint owner challenged a decision of the District Court of Williamson County, 368th Judicial District (Texas) dismissing her action alleging conversion, money had and received, and conspiracy against appellees, her former husband, a bank, a lienholder, and buyers, regarding the sale of a tractor/trailer (truck) jointly-owned by appellant and the husband that was sold pursuant to their Arizona divorce proceeding. Overview: The truck was subject to liens held by the bank and appellant's divorce attorney confirmed that appellant contemplated the sale of the truck from the beginning of the divorce proceedings. The court affirmed as to conversion and money had and received as it was it was undisputed that, from appellant's meeting with her divorce attorney, the sale of the truck was contemplated as part of the divorce. Further, appellant presented no evidence that the attorney was not authorized to act on her behalf in the divorce proceeding. Because there was no evidence to establish either conversion or money had and received, the trial court correctly determined that there was no evidence to support the conspiracy claim. Also, given appellant's repeated failures to comply with discovery requests, as well as the trial court's initial attempts to impose lesser sanctions, less severe sanctions would not have been sufficient to promote compliance. Dismissal for want of prosecution was proper when appellant failed to take any action in the trial court for a two-year period following the court's grant of summary judgments in favor of four of the six defendants/appellees. Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Procedural Posture: A money judgment was rendered against a judgment debtor. The judgment debtor and his spouse sold property to appellee buyer. Appellant creditor obtained an "alias" writ of execution on the judgment and attempted to seize the property when executing the writ. Litigation ensued. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas granted the buyer's motion for partial summary judgment. The creditor appealed and moved to certify a question. Overview: The judgment was never allowed to become dormant under Texas law because of the issuance of writs of execution. However, the court found that the judgment lien was allowed to expire for a period of time. The original judgment was rendered on October 9, 1991, and the judgment lien was established when a first judgment creditor filed the first abstract of judgment on May 18, 1992, in the official public records of a county. The judgment lien had a statutory life of ten years from May 18, 1992, to May 18, 2002, under Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 52.006 (2005). The creditor filed a subsequent abstract of judgment on August 29, 2003. According to the Texas Property Code, the second lien was valid from August 29, 2003, to August 29, 2013. The first lien expired on May 18, 2002, and the subsequent lien did not attach until August 29, 2003. After the first lien expired, and before the second lien attached, there was no valid lien on the property. This allowed the buyer to receive title to the property from the judgment debtor without the encumbrance of a lien. The bankruptcy court did not err in holding that the judgment lien had expired even though the underlying judgment remained valid. Outcome: The motion to certify a question was denied. The order granting the buyer's motion for partial summary judgment was affirmed.

Procedural Posture: Appellant business owner filed a restricted appeal to challenged the default judgment rendered against him by the County Court at Law No. 1 of Travis County, Texas, in favor of appellee company. Overview: The owner was served using substituted service. The appellate court found that the record did not show that the company strictly complied with the requirements for substituted service. Although the suit was against the owner's business, nothing in the affidavit established the business's address as the owner's usual place of business, usual place of abode, or a place where he could probably be found. One person could own or operate more than one business. In fact, the process server was repeatedly told that the owner was not easy to find at the particular business address. It was a reasonable inference that leaving the citation affixed to the door of that business would not be reasonably. effective to give notice of the suit. Also, there was an irregularity in the return of service. The sworn affidavit of delivery attached to the return of service stated that the citation and petition were served on November 39, 2003. Although the impossible date of November 39 might appear to be a minor typographical error, the date of the owner's answer and the earliest date on which a default could be taken hinged on the date of service under Tex. R. Civ. P. 107. Outcome: The default judgment was reversed and remanded.

Procedural Posture: At an ex parte hearing to collect on a default judgment, the District Court of Williamson County, 277th Judicial District, Texas, granted turnover relief and appointment of a receiver to appellee judgment creditor, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002(b) (Supp. 2004). The trial court also awarded attorney's fees, ordered the sheriff to seize the property, and failed to respond to a request for findings. Appellant debtor sought review. Overview: The debtor argued that the failure to respond to his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law was reversible error. The court disagreed, finding that any error was harmless. Although two turnover hearings were held ex parte, the debtor's continued avoidance of the judgment debt for over three years formed the only basis for the orders, and the debtor was aware both of his obligation on the debt and his avoidance of it. It within the district court's discretion to rely on evidence of the assets that included the debtor's deposition testimony and a commercial security agreement in which he listed his assets. The court found specious the debtor's argument that he needed a more detailed record to establish that he owned the property. The court also found that the debtor's due process and jury- trial rights were not violated. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.002 allowed a trial court to enforce a prior order that had been refused or disobeyed, and the judgment was entered after the debtor failed to appear at the original hearing, of which he had notice. The judgment afforded the debtor notice that post judgment proceedings would follow. Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Procedural Posture: In a suit by plaintiff family against defendant refinery owners for the death of the decedent allegedly caused by workplace exposure to benzene, the 133rd District Court, Harris County (Texas), granted a no-evidence summary judgment motion in favor of the refinery owners on the issue of causation. The family appealed. Overview: The decedent was working for a petrochemical plant. Throughout his career, the decedent worked in an aromatics recovery unit holding various positions as assistant stillman, helper, boardman, and operator. During the course of his work, the decedent was exposed to a variety of chemicals, including benzene, mixed xylenes, ethylene, and propane. There were allegedly numerous benzene leaks at the plant. The decedent was diagnosed with bronchial alveolar carcinoma, a form of terminal lung cancer. The family sued the refinery owners for negligence and gross negligence in a wrongful death action. The petition alleged that the refinery owners were responsible for the decedent's death. The family's experts relied on three epidemiological studies to support their conclusion that benzene exposure caused the decedent's death. However, none of the studies had the requisite risk doubling; therefore, none of the studies reached the standard of statistical significance. Thus, the family presented no evidence of general causation. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the refinery owners' motion for summary judgment. Outcome: The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Procedural Posture: Appellant owner sued appellee businesses in the District Court of Williamson County, Texas, for conversion, conspiracy, and misappropriation of funds resulting from the sale of a truck and trailer. The trial court granted the businesses' motion for sanctions and partial summary judgment. The owner appealed. Overview: The owner's lawsuit stemmed from the sale of a truck and trailer owned by her and her husband as community property and subsequently sold under an alleged agreement after their divorce. The owner alleged she did not consent to the sale and the businesses filed several discovery motions. The trial court held the owner consented to the sale of the truck and trailer and that she was precluded from introducing any evidence to deny her consent. Although the aforementioned ruling eliminated the owner's claims against some of the businesses, it did not address certain remaining defendants. The appellate court initially noted, with exceptions inapplicable to the owner's appeal, an appellate court only had jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments. The appellate court held to be final, the judgment needed to dispose of all parties and issues before the court. The appellate court concluded the sanctions order did not unequivocally dispose of the claims against all of the defendants, or at best disposed of the claims inferentially; however, the order was insufficient to warrant a finding it was a final judgment. Outcome: The owner's appeal was dismissed.

PER CURIAM OPINION: Decision of the Williamson County District Court cannot be collaterally attacked by a federal court.

Procedural Posture: Appellants, staffing service and law firm, appealed from the 261st Judicial District Court, Travis County, Texas, award of summary judgment against staffing service, and sanctions against law firm, where appellant staffing service sued for recovery on appellee's unpaid account established by a predecessor and appellant law firm's actions in allegedly suing the wrong party. Overview: Appellant staffing service sued appellee construction company for recovery on its unpaid account originally established with appellee's predecessor entity. Appellant staffing service provided staffing services to that unincorporated entity. Thereafter, appellee incorporated itself. Appellant staffing service served discovery requests on appellee. Appellee's attorneys denied it had any dealings with appellant staffing service and refused to produce a representative for a deposition. Appellee moved for summary judgment against appellant staffing service and requested sanctions against appellant law firm. Appellant staffing service requested a continuance, alleging it had not had enough time to determine whether appellee had assumed its predecessor's liabilities. The trial court denied the continuance motion, granted the summary judgment motion, and imposed the sanctions requested. Appellants challenged those holdings. The court reversed and vacated the sanctions. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for continuance because appellant staffing service needed more time to determine whether appellee assumed the liabilities of its predecessor. Outcome: Summary judgment grant reversed, sanctions vacated, and case remanded as the trial court abused its discretion in denying staffing service motion for continuance because it was not given adequate time to conduct discovery to determine whether appellee construction company assumed its predecessor entity's liabilities. Sanctions against appellee law firm had to be vacated until proper discovery could be completed.

Procedural Posture: Appellant land conveyors challenged a grant of summary judgment for appellee note executors, entered by the 257th Judicial District Court of Williamson County (Texas), in a case where appellees filed suit seeking a declaration that appellants lacked any enforceable interest in a promissory note and the liens securing it. Overview: Appellee note executors sought a declaration appellant land conveyors lacked any enforceable interest in a promissory note and liens securing it. Appellants counterclaimed for the note's unpaid amount and for foreclosure of the liens. Appellees had executed the note involved to appellants for a land conveyance. The note was transferred and an unexplained gap in ownership occurred. The original note was lost. The trial court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment and held the note was a negotiable instrument. The trial court also held a genuine dispute existed about ownership of the note and the inability of appellants to enforce the lien securing it. Further, the trial court awarded appellees' attorney fees. Appellants challenged. The court affirmed as to the negotiable instrument determination, but held affidavits on file raised issues about whether appellants owned the note, their right to enforce the liens, and the reasonableness of the attorney fees. Outcome: Trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellee note executors affirmed as to t determination promissory note was a negotiable instrument, but reversed on note's ownership, right to enforce vendor's lien, and attorney fee award to appellees because issues of material fact remained regarding ownership, lien rights and reasonableness of fee.

Procedural Posture: Appellant seller challenged a no-answer default judgment of the 107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas, as appellant received no service for process from appellee buyer and therefore failed to answer in a suit for breach of a purchase agreement. Overview: Appellee buyer brought suit against appellant seller pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code. Ann. Ch. 37. Upon appellant's failure to appear, the trial court entered a default judgment. Appellant sought review, contending that the default judgment was erroneously entered, as appellee failed to exercise reasonable diligence n attempting to serve appellant before resorting to substituted service on the Secretary of State. The court could find no evidence in the entire record of appellee's diligence in attempting to serve appellant's registered agent. The court held that due to improper service the trial court did not have jurisdiction over appellant and erred in entering a no-answer default judgment. The court therefore reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. Outcome: The court reversed and remanded this cause for further proceedings because the trial court did not have jurisdiction over appellant due to improper service of process.